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1. Introduction 
Other-regarding preferences are a fundamental cornerstone in the human ability to cooperate 
in large groups of genetic strangers (Bowles, 2004; Boyd and Richerson, 2005). This raises 
the important question how other-regarding preferences develop in human life, in particular 
examining the age at which other-regarding behavior sets in and whether there are gender 
differences in behavior. Recent research has focused on the development of the upside of 
other-regarding preferences by showing that egalitarianism and efficiency concerns become 
more prominent as children and teenagers get older (Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach, 2008; 
Almås et al., 2010). However, theory suggests that other-regarding behavior in groups may 
co-evolve with parochialism, a potentially harmful downside of other-regarding preferences 
(Choi and Bowles, 2007). The development of parochialism – implying in-group favoritism 
and out-group hostility – has received little attention so far (see Bernhard, Fischbacher and 
Fehr, 2006; Goette, Huffman and Meier, 2006, for studies with adults). The same holds true 
for the development of spitefulness, a human trait that puts negative value on the other 
person’s well-being. While spitefulness seems to be a robust phenomenon of a non-negligible 
minority of adult subjects (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005; Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter, 
2008; Kerschbamer, 2012), nothing is known so far about the relative frequency of spiteful 
behavior in childhood and adolescence and how it might change with age. 
In this paper, we study in a unified framework how both benevolent and malevolent 
other-regarding preferences develop in a sample of 717 subjects aged 8 to 17 years. We allow 
each subject to make three simple allocation choices from which we can classify her 
preference type as either egalitarian, altruistic, or spiteful. Egalitarian types prefer allocations 
that yield equal payoffs for both parties over those with unequal payoffs. Altruistic types 
value the other person’s payoff or the joint payoff positively, and spiteful types put a negative 
value on the other person’s payoff. We also vary whether the recipient of the allocation is an 
in-group or an out-group member, in order to study parochialism and how it develops with 
age. While there is already quite some evidence on other-regarding preferences and the 
influence of age on them, little is still know about the emergence of parochialism with age. 
We find a strong decrease of spitefulness with increasing age. Egalitarianism becomes 
less frequent and altruism much more prominent with age, the latter implying that the choice 
of the pie-maximizing allocation increases with age. Females are more frequently classified as 
an egalitarian type than males are (which is similar to findings for adults; see Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009), and females are less often what we call an altruistic type. Interestingly, 
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parochialism in the form of a worse treatment of out-group members, compared to in-group 
members, emerges and first becomes significant in the teenage years. Hence, while altruism 
becomes more important in adolescence, we observe more discrimination against out-group 
members at the same time, which is consistent with the main result in Choi and Bowles 
(2007). 
Studying the benevolent and malevolent aspects of other-regarding preferences is 
important because knowledge about other-regarding preferences is key in designing 
institutions and their associated incentives. In particular, egalitarianism (i.e., inequality 
aversion) and reciprocity are likely to be important in employer-employee relationships in 
labor markets (Bewley, 1998). Negative other-regarding preferences – like spite – have been 
found to be influential on behavior as well, for instance by inducing sabotage in tournaments 
(Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011). Beyond influencing behavior in small-scale groups, other-
regarding preferences may also shape a society decisively by affecting decisions on social 
welfare or taxation (Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval, 2007). 
While many studies have examined other-regarding preferences in adults (see 
Camerer, 2003, or Cooper and Kagel, 2012, for surveys), much less is yet known about how 
these preferences develop with age, in particular before humans enter working life. Studying 
the development of other-regarding preferences is interesting for several reasons. First, from a 
theoretical perspective, it can illuminate how models of economic behavior (e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) can account for the 
behavior of children and teenagers. These models were developed on the basis of 
experimental evidence from adult subjects, but it is unclear whether adult behavior is the 
consequence of any directional development in the prevalence of other-regarding preferences. 
The fact that economic decision making “may well change over the long term, with changes 
in age, education, political and religious beliefs, and other characteristics” (Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000, p. 171) has been well acknowledged. In our paper, we hope to contribute to 
a more detailed understanding of how age influences distributional preferences. Second, from 
an applied perspective, knowing more about the different types of other-regarding preferences 
and their intensity in childhood and adolescence can provide a benchmark against which adult 
behavior can be measured. A comparison of the intensity of benevolent other-regarding 
preferences observed in adulthood compared to childhood and adolescence is of great interest. 
If it is stronger in adulthood, this would imply that socialization in the teenage years should 
be considered as helpful for promoting efficient interactions in the workplace; if it is weaker, 
humans would seem to “lose” efficiency-promoting other-regarding preferences in the 
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transition from childhood to adult age. Third, empirical evidence proves that children and 
adolescents influence to a large extent many household decisions and over the past few 
decades their purchasing power has increased substantially – at least in highly developed 
countries (McNeal, 1992; Dauphin, 2011). Fourth, and more generally, given the fact that 
children’s economic decisions differ in many areas from adults’ decisions, important 
sociopolitical consequences emerge. Policies, imposed by adults on children, may not be in 
accordance with the preferences of the affected children if adults do not know the children’s 
preferences well. Beyond this aspect, if other-regarding preferences were to be found to be 
susceptible to policy interventions in education – a question that is still open to thorough 
investigation – knowing the distribution and the developmental changes of other-regarding 
preferences during childhood and adolescence would be a prerequisite for any kind of 
intervention. 
The economic decision making of children and adolescents has received increasing 
attention in recent years. William Harbaugh and Kate Krause pioneered the systematic 
investigation of how children make economic decisions in a wide array of domains, such as 
rationality in revealed preferences (Harbaugh, Krause and Berry, 2001), risk taking 
(Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund, 2002), or trust and trustworthiness (Harbaugh et al., 
2003b). As far as other-regarding preferences in children and teenagers are concerned, the 
overall evidence seems to suggest that humans become less selfish as they grow older 
(Murnighan and Saxon, 1998; Harbaugh, Krause and Liday, 2003a; Benenson, Pascoe and 
Radmore, 2007; Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Gummerum et al., 2008, 2010). These studies, 
however, have concentrated on a binary classification of more or less selfish behavior, 
preventing the classification of subjects into different types of other-regarding preferences 
and, hence, leaving open the investigation of how the distribution of types changes with age. 
Fehr et al. (2008) took a first step in classifying different types of children’s other-
regarding preferences by devising three simple allocation tasks from which they can infer a 
subject’s type as egalitarian, altruistic, or spiteful. Their experiment with 229 children, aged 3 
to 8, shows that egalitarianism (i.e., inequality aversion) develops strongly between the ages 
of 3 and 8. While selfishness clearly dominates in 3-year-olds, many 7 to 8-year-olds prefer 
egalitarian allocations.1 More precisely, about 60% of children aged 7 to 8 can be classified as 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, the desire for egalitarian allocations seems to be deeply rooted in infants already, as recent 
research has shown. Children who are 15 to 21 month old show some fairness understanding and altruistic 
behavior by gazing significantly longer when resources are distributed unequally between two recipients as 
opposed to equally (Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon and Premack, 2012). Egalitarian 
allocations seem also to make an allocator more attractive to infants, because 16-month-olds have a clear 
preference for a fair rather than an unfair allocator (Geraci and Surian, 2011). 
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having egalitarian preferences, while the corresponding share for 3 to 4-year-olds is smaller 
with around 20%. While it is true that also preschoolers can share equally (Sigelman and 
Waitzman, 1991; Olson and Spelke, 2008), the fraction seems to increase with age. Related 
research has also found that starting from an age of six to eight years, children show already a 
tendency to sacrifice their own resources in order to be fair, increasing the likelihood of 
egalitarian allocations (Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw and Olson, 2012).2 
We use the experimental design of Fehr et al. (2008) and extend their analysis to 
adolescence in order to study how the transition to adulthood shapes subjects’ other-regarding 
preferences. This will allow us to bridge the gap between children (as in Fehr et al., 2008) and 
adults, while keeping the design identical. The age span considered in our paper is similar to 
that investigated in a paper by Almås et al. (2010) on the development of inequality 
acceptance. They ran experiments with 486 subjects, aged 10 to 18, who had to make 
distributional choices in modified dictator games where the pie to be distributed could depend 
– in addition to own productivity – on luck and the efficiency of giving away money to the 
recipient. They found that older children are more willing to accept inequalities when the 
latter are the consequence of individual achievements; furthermore, they care more about 
efficiency than younger children do. The authors also observe gender differences in efficiency 
concerns. From the 9th grade onwards efficiency considerations play a more important role for 
male than for female participants. Overall, their findings imply that children’s fairness norms 
evolve from favoring equality in their youngest cohort of 10-year-olds (similar to 8-year-olds 
in Fehr et al., 2008) to favoring equity in the older age groups. Compared to Almås et al. 
(2010), our design also allows us to study the development of spitefulness and, in particular, 
the influence of parochialism, which is the main innovation in our paper. 
A paper by Martinsson et al. (2011) studied the development of social preferences in a 
sample of 650 Austrian and Swedish children and teenagers aged 10 to 15 years. In six 
dictator games subjects had to choose one of two possible payoff allocations. From these 
choices subjects were classified into four preference types: self-interest, social welfare, 
difference aversion and competitive. The core finding of the paper is that difference aversion 
(which is a similar concept to inequality aversion) decreases while social-welfare 
considerations become more important with age, which is in line with our findings. Compared 
                                                 
2 Another strand of literature deals with the question whether what is observed by a researcher as fair behavior is 
partly motivated by a desire of experimental subjects to appear fair. While this has been shown to be the case for 
adults (Batson et al., 1997; Batson, Thompson and Chen, 2002), only recent work by Shaw et al. (2013) has 
illustrated the same pattern for children. In their study, children as young as of age 6 to 8 years show fair 
behavior that is not only motivated by means of true fairness, but also in order to appear fair to others. See also 
Houser, Montinari and Piovesan (2012) for how reputation concerns affect children’s decision making. 
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to the paper by Martinsson et al. (2011) we are also able to study spitefulness and 
parochialism. The latter feature of our study is also the main, and important, difference to a 
working paper by Sutter et al. (2010) in which they use the design of Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004) to classify subjects into inequality averse, maximin, efficiency-loving and selfish. 
While Sutter et al. (2010) use almost the same subject pool as here (separated by more than 
six months, though), they do not study spitefulness and parochialism. As far as the 
development of egalitarianism and altruism is concerned, it is reassuring that both papers  
yield similar results, despite employing two different research designs. As children and 
teenagers grow older, inequality aversion becomes less important, while efficiency concerns 
increase in importance for boys and maximin-preferences gain importance in shaping 
behavior of girls. 
Studying both spite and parochialism in our paper will shed light on the malevolent 
side of other-regarding preferences. This is also important from a theoretical point of view, 
since recent evolutionary theories suggest that prosocial behavior (i.e., the benevolent side) 
and parochialism (i.e., the malevolent side of other-regarding preferences) evolve jointly 
(Choi and Bowles, 2007). An examination of common developmental origins of the 
benevolent and malevolent aspects of other-regarding preferences is therefore of great 
interest. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the experimental design 
and procedure in section 2. Section 3 presents the results, and section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Experimental design and procedure 
2.1. Design 
Participants in our study had to make decisions in three simple allocation tasks that we will 
refer to as games below.3 Each participant was matched with one anonymous partner from the 
same age cohort, and had to choose between two allocations that assigned money between the 
two players. The order of presentation of the three decisions and two allocations was 
randomized. 
                                                 
3 Of course, the allocation tasks are not interactive games, but rather individual decision making tasks. However, 
for notational convenience, we prefer the term “game” for the three different tasks. 
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The prosocial game offered a choice between the allocation (1,1) – that is, 1 point for 
the decision maker, 1 point for the recipient – and the allocation (1,0). This game serves as a 
measure of the most basic form of prosociality, namely the willingness to avoid advantageous 
inequality for the benefit of the partner. Importantly, prosociality in this game has no costs for 
the decision maker, enabling various different motives to drive the choice (1,1): an egalitarian 
preference that avoids inequalities (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), 
efficiency-seeking (Charness and Rabin, 2002), a desire to maximize the payoff of the worst-
off subject (maximin; Rawls, 1974), or even self-interested behavior because a purely self-
interested individual would randomly choose between the two allocations as she receives one 
point regardless of her decision. 
In the envy game, the decision maker had to choose between allocations (1,1) and 
(1,2). As in the prosocial game, the decision maker can increase the partner’s payoff at no cost 
to herself, but now this choice results in disadvantageous inequality. Looking at a subject’s 
pattern of choices in both the prosocial and the envy games allows distinguishing inequality 
aversion from a motive to be altruistic towards the partner by increasing his payoff, or from a 
motive of spite that minimizes the partner’s payoffs. If an individual wants to avoid 
inequality, she chooses (1,1) in both games. An altruistic individual who cares for the 
partner’s payoff, however, would choose (1,1) in the prosocial game and (1,2) in the envy 
game. A spiteful individual, finally, would pick (1,0) in the prosocial game and (1,1) in the 
envy game. 
The sharing game let subjects choose between allocations (1,1) and (2,0). Contrary to 
the previous games, the egalitarian choice of (1,1) is costly for the decision maker and thus 
indicates a strong form of inequality aversion. Note that the prediction for a selfish decision 
maker implies unambiguously the choice of (2,0) in this game, while picking the egalitarian 
option clearly indicates prosocial behavior. 
Considering a subject’s pattern of choices across all three games allows the 
classification of different types of other-regarding preferences. In particular, we will classify 
subjects into five behavioral types. Strongly egalitarian subjects pick the egalitarian 
allocation (1,1) in all three games. Weakly egalitarian subjects choose the egalitarian 
allocation in all games except the sharing game, where egalitarian behavior is costly. Strongly 
altruistic subjects always select the allocation that maximizes the partner’s payoff and at the 
same time the joint payoff. Weakly altruistic subjects opt for the allocation that maximizes the 
partner’s payoff and the joint payoff in all games except the sharing game. Finally, spiteful 
subjects always prefer the allocation that minimizes the partner’s payoff or maximizes the 
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positive difference in own versus partner’s payoff.4 Table 1 summarizes the classification of 
subjects. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In order to study the development of parochialism, we implemented an in-group and 
an out-group condition across subjects. While the recipient in the in-group condition was 
known to be from the same class (his or her identity remained secret, of course), the recipient 
in the out-group condition attended another school, but was in the same grade. This was 
common knowledge to students (see the instructions in the Appendix). The in-group condition 
was implemented in two different ways. In the “in-group all” condition, all students from a 
respective class participated once as sender to another in-group member and once as recipient 
of a transfer from another in-group member in the experiment. In contrast, only half of the 
students from a respective class participated in the experiment as sender the “in-group half” 
condition, while the remaining students acted as recipients of the senders’ transfers and thus 
did not make any decisions. We chose the in-group all condition as a method to collect more 
data from our subject pool. Moreover, this allowed us to investigate whether it makes a 
difference if each subject participates in the experiment as sender as well as receiver (as in the 
in-group all condition) or only as a sender (as in the in-group half condition). Separate χ2-
tests for each age group and game reveal that no significant differences between the two in-
group conditions could be observed (see Table 2), allowing us to pool the data from both 
conditions. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
2.2. Subject pool and procedure 
This experiment was part of a 2-year project run in seven schools in Tyrol, which is a federal 
state in western Austria. The project was approved by the State Board of Education in Tyrol, 
and the headmasters of participating schools gave permission to conduct several experiments 
in intervals of two to three months. These experiments were run in class during regular school 
hours. We randomly selected a total of 38 classes in the 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 11th grades at the 
                                                 
4 Note, that we do not differentiate between spiteful types who minimize the partner’s payoff and competitive 
types who try to do as good as possible compared to the partner. We also do not elicit envious types who reduce 
the partner’s payoff only when he is ahead and don’t care about the partner’s payoff in all other cases.  
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beginning of the project, and followed them for two school years. Parents were informed 
about the project, which was described as a scientific project that studies decision making in 
children and teenagers, but without revealing any details on any of the experiments. All 
students except five received their parent’s permission to participate in the project. Besides 
asking parents for consent, we also solicited each student’s willingness to participate in the 
experiments. No single student dissented. This whole procedure constitutes a particularly 
noteworthy feature of our experiment, as it avoids any kind of problems due to self-selection 
into an experiment. 
The experiment was carefully explained in class, and all participants had to answer 
two control questions to check their understanding before starting the experiment (see 
Appendix).5 We proceed in our analysis with those 717 participants in the role of a decision 
maker who answered both questions correctly, and exclude 35 other decision makers with 
incorrect answers from the following analysis (see Table 3). The results presented below 
remain qualitatively identical if the 35 excluded subjects were included in the analysis. In 
addition to the 752 decision makers, we had 443 subjects as passive recipients of the decision 
makers’ choices. Recall that 309 subjects (out of the 752 decision makers) participated in the 
in-group all condition where they were both active decision makers and passive receivers. 
 
Table 3 and 4 about here 
 
The points earned in the experiment were converted into Euros for payment. The 
exchange rate was made roughly proportional to the average weekly pocket money within 
each grade (see Table 4). This approach was taken to ensure that the marginal incentives were 
comparable across grades. 
Finally, we would like to mention that the use of one-shot games under anonymity, as 
in this study, is a key factor in distinguishing prosocial behavior from purely selfish motives. 
Selfish motives may also play a role in repeated interaction or face-to-face contacts, meaning 
that subjects behave prosocially just to benefit in future interactions. This is ruled out in our 
study. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Note that this is different from the paper by Fehr et al. (2008), where the experiment was explained and carried 
out individually with each subject. Given the fact that we wanted to implement a design which was identical for 
all age groups and obvious problems like a higher tendency to elicit socially desired behavior in individual 
interactions among older participants and experimenters we decided to run the experiments in class with pen and 
paper. 
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3. Experimental results 
Below we will first analyze behavior in single games, and then study the pattern of other-
regarding preferences that emerges when all three decisions of a subject are considered. 
Within each subsection, we proceed with an analysis that addresses the influence of (i) age, 
(ii) parochialism, and (iii) gender. 
 
3.1. Behavior in single games 
(i) Age. Figure 1 shows the relative frequency of choosing the egalitarian allocation (1,1) in 
each game across our five different age cohorts. The figure pools data from the in-group and 
out-group conditions as well as from girls and boys, in order to present the overall pattern of 
results. Figure 1 reveals important and systematic behavioral changes across age. In the 
prosocial game, the relative frequency of choosing (1,1) over (1,0) increases monotonically 
with age. Almost 90% of 16- to 17-year-olds choose the egalitarian allocation, while only 
54% of 8- to 9-year-olds do so. An inverse pattern is found for the envy game. Here we note a 
marked decline of the egalitarian choice from 80% for 8- to 9-year-olds to 40% for 16- to 17-
year-olds. Hence, the altruistic allocation of (1,2) is much more frequently chosen at older 
ages, indicating that tolerance towards disadvantageous inequality increases in older subjects 
(which is similar to the main finding in Almås et al., 2010). We do not find a monotonic age 
effect in the sharing game. On average, only around 10% of subjects in each age group choose 
the (costly) egalitarian allocation (1,1) over (2,0).6 Hence, when it costs money, the 
egalitarian choice is selected much less frequently than when it is not costly. Table 5 presents 
the results of probit regressions for the three games in which the decision to choose the 
egalitarian allocation (1,1) is the dependent variable. As independent variables, we consider a 
                                                 
6 Note, that our results for 8- to 9-year-olds are different from the results of Fehr et al. (2008) for 7- to 8-year-
olds. Yet, this difference can be attributed to a difference in rewards used in both studies, as is shown in 
unpublished work by Fehr, Glätzle-Rützler and Sutter (2012). They show that if sweets are used as a reward 
medium, 54% of the eight- to nine-year olds prefer the egalitarian option in the sharing game, which is no longer 
significantly different from the 45% of seven-to eight-year olds in the study by Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach 
(2008). This means that Fehr et al. (2012) can basically replicate the Fehr et al. (2008) results when sweets are 
used as reward medium. Concerning the prosocial game, results are even closer. While Fehr et al. (2012) find 
that 79% of subjects prefer the egalitarian choice when their behavior is incentivized with sweets, Fehr et al. 
(2008) report 80% of egalitarian choices. The paper by Fehr et al. (2012) is intended to study the effects of the 
reward medium, but doesn’t consider any aspects of development of choice behavior with age, which 
distinguishes it clearly from this paper. Here, we have used money as a reward medium in order to have an 
attractive reward medium especially for our oldest subjects. On a more general level, we note that as economists 
we prefer, in general, the use of monetary rewards since money is a general means of exchange – while non-
monetary rewards typically lack this property and therefore might inhibit the generalizability of behavior with 
particular rewards. However, using money is not always possible when working with children (for instance due 
to restrictions from participating schools), for which reason Fehr et al. (2012) has been written as a contribution 
to understand how different rewards influence behavior. 
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dummy for female and in-group, as well as the variable age exact which measures the exact 
age of our participants in years and months. The results in Table 5 reveal a significantly 
positive age effect for the prosocial game and a negative one for the envy game. 
 
Figures 1 – 3 and Table 5 about here 
 
(ii) Parochialism. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of parochialism. Panel (a) shows that the 
egalitarian allocation of (1,1) is chosen more frequently in the in-group than in the out-group 
condition from the age of 12 to 13 years onward in the prosocial game. While Table 5 
presents a significant main effect of in-group, adding an interaction term in-group*age exact 
(as well as an interaction term female*age exact) to the specification in Table 5 reveals that 
the in-group effect is significant only from the age of 12/13 years on (p < 0.05 for females and 
males).7,8 This additional specification is included in Table A1 in the Appendix.9 Panel (b) 
reveals that the decline in the relative frequency of choosing (1,1) is much steeper for the in-
group than the out-group condition in the envy game. This indicates that as subjects get older, 
they are relatively more willing to accept disadvantageous inequality in the in-group than in 
the out-group condition. The in-group effect – while non-significant in the main specification 
of Table 5 – is significant for the oldest two age groups of 14- to 15- and 16- to 17-year-olds 
(p < 0.01 for females and males; see Table A1 in the Appendix)10. In the sharing game in 
panel (c), we note that sharing is, in general, more frequently observed in the in-group than in 
                                                 
7 Note, that in Figure 2(a) the difference between the in- and out-group condition for the oldest age group of 16- 
to 17-year olds is small. However, the difference is significant in a multiple regression controlling for additional 
factors such as gender and the exact age and not only the condition. 
8 Table 5 (and Table 6) use individual level data, applying robust standard errors on the class level. A fairly 
conservative approach would be to take the average behavior within one class as one independent unit of 
observation and then apply non-parametric tests. Given that we have at most eight classes per grade (six in grade 
3, and eight in each of the grades 5, 7, 9, and 11), such conservative testing typically fails significance at 
conventional levels. For this reason, we have pooled the classes in grades 5 and 7 (the first four years in this type 
of school) and grades 9 and 11 (the final four years in this type of school), yielding 16 classes in each subsample 
to perform Mann-Whitney U-tests. Then we take the average choice in the prosocial game within one class as 
one unit of observation and compare classes in the in-group condition with those in the out-group condition. This 
yields a significant difference for pooled grades 9 and 11 (p < 0.01; N = 16). 
9 We do not present the extended models with interaction terms in the main body of the text for reasons of 
succinctness. Note that standard software does not correctly calculate marginal effects and p-values of 
interaction terms in nonlinear models (see Ai and Norton, 2003). We corrected for this and present the adjusted 
tests on joint coefficients in the Appendix. It is noteworthy, however, that the extended models shown in the 
appendix have a worse fit – according to BIC (Bayesian information criterion) – than the models shown in Table 
5. 
10 A (weakly) significant difference in grades 9 and 11 is also confirmed in the conservative testing approach 
described in footnote 8 above (p = 0.06; N = 16). 
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the out-group condition. This difference is significant from the age of 10 to 11 years onwards 
(p < 0.05 for females, p < 0.1 for males; see Table A1).11 
(iii) Gender. Figure 3 presents the behavior of girls and boys in the three games. While there 
is no clear cut pattern of gender differences at the aggregate level in the prosocial game in 
panel (a), girls are always more likely to choose the egalitarian allocation (1,1) in the envy 
game in panel (b). Table 5 illustrates that the gender effect is significant, and an extended 
model that includes an interaction term of female*age exact (as well as an interaction term in-
group*age exact) shows that the gender effect is present and significant in each single age 
group (p < 0.1 for in-group and out-group; see Table A1 in the Appendix). Girls are also more 
likely to choose (1,1) in the sharing game in each age group, except in the oldest one, as can 
be seen in panel (c) of Figure 3. We note from Table A1 that the gender difference is 
significant for the three youngest age groups, i.e., up to the age of 12 to 13 years (p < 0.05 for 
in-group and out-group). 
 
3.2. Distribution of other-regarding preference types – Behavior across 
all three games 
Recall from Table 1 the classification of other-regarding preference types from a subject’s 
pattern of choices across all three games. While the three games allow for 8 different choice 
patterns, it is reassuring to note that the five types listed in Table 1 cover the vast majority of 
subjects. In the data presented in figures 4 to 6, between 92% and 100% of subjects belong to 
one of these 5 types. The share of subjects which can be classified into these 5 types slightly 
increases with age. Note also that strongly egalitarian and strongly altruistic types are rare, 
meaning that three types (spiteful, weakly altruistic, and weakly egalitarian) characterize the 
large majority (of at least 77%) of subjects. The infrequency of strong types (versus weak 
types) leads us to pool strongly and weakly egalitarian types, respectively strongly and 
weakly altruistic types, in the regressions reported in Table 6. 
 
Figures 4 – 6 and Table 6 about here 
 
                                                 
11 Note that panel (c) of Figure 2 cannot perfectly convey this significant in-group effect in the sharing game, 
especially for 14- to 15-year-old teenagers, since the multiple regression model can control more appropriately 
for the variation in the data than the figure can. If we use a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test with the 
average choices in a class as the unit of observation, we get p = 0.14 (p = 0.15) for the subset of 10/11- and 
12/13-year olds (14/15- and 16/17-year olds), with N = 16 per subset. 
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(i) Age. Figure 4 shows that the relative frequency of egalitarian and spiteful types decreases 
typically with age, while altruistic types become more frequent with age. The modal type is 
the spiteful one for 8- to 9-year-olds, while it is the weakly altruistic type for the 16- to 17-
year-olds. Table 6 presents probit regressions for each type, confirming a significantly 
positive effect of age on altruism, and a significantly negative effect on spitefulness and 
egalitarianism (p < 0.01 in each case).12 
(ii) Parochialism. Comparing the upper and lower panels in Figure 5 reveals that spiteful 
types are always more frequent in the out-group condition than in the in-group condition. An 
extended probit regression (shown in Table A2 in the Appendix) shows that parochialism 
becomes significant from the age of 12 to 13 years onwards (p < 0.01 for each age group and 
gender in this range). For altruistic types, we find significant parochialism in 14- to 15- and 
16- to 17-year-olds (p < 0.05 for both age groups as well as gender; see Table A2). Egalitarian 
types are the only group for which we do not observe any significant difference between the 
in-group and out-group conditions.13 
(iii) Gender. Figure 6 shows marked gender differences. We note a larger fraction of 
egalitarian types and a smaller fraction of altruistic types in girls than in boys for each single 
age group (for in-group and out-group; for 8- to 10-year-olds the gender effect fails 
significance at p = 0.148). These main effects of gender are documented in Table 6 and also 
in Table A2. Only for spiteful types we do not find any significant gender differences. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We studied how egalitarianism, altruism, spitefulness and parochialism change in late 
childhood and adolescence. Using a sample of 717 students, and avoiding any kind of self-
selection into the experiment, we find significant changes in the distribution of other-
                                                 
12 One might think that the increase of altruistic types could be due to social ties increasing as many children 
might stay within the same class as they get older. Yet, there is an increase in such types from 8/9-year olds to 
10/11-year olds, although 8/9-year olds have been in the same class for three years, while 10/11-year olds are in 
a completely new class (since after primary school children change schools and seldom stay on with former 
classmates). Furthermore, since there is a substantial reshuffling of classes, and many new entrants, at the 
beginning of grade 9 (the 14/15-year olds), such an argument would also not fully explain why the trend is fairly 
monotonic across all age groups. Moreover, as altruism towards the out-group is also increasing with age, this 
indicates that the increase of altruism with age cannot (only) be driven by a potential development of social ties. 
13 Using average choices within a class as unit of observations and applying non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-
tests, we find that spiteful types are more frequent in the out-group than in the in-group condition both in the set 
of children aged 10/11 and 12/13 (p = 0.1; N = 16) and the set of 14/15- and 16/17-year olds (p = 0.02; N = 16). 
For altruistic types, we have p = 0.06 for the group of 14/15- and 16/17-year olds (N = 16). For egalitarian types, 
we find no significant effects of parochialism in any non-parametric test. 
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regarding preferences from the age of 8 to 9 years until the age of 16 to 17 years. While 
previous studies have found that egalitarianism increases sharply in 3- to 8-year-old children 
(Fehr et al., 2008), this motive loses its dominance in adolescence when the altruistic type 
becomes prevalent. Overall, the evidence from Fehr et al. (2008) for young children and from 
Almås et al. (2010) and this submission for adolescents suggests that there is peak in the quest 
for egalitarianism around the age of eight years. Before that age, egalitarian motives become 
more important with age, while beyond this age they are pushed more into the background by 
an increasing influence of efficiency-considerations. 
This strong development of what we have called an altruistic type in adolescence 
contributes to an increase in overall efficiency, which is an important prerequisite for smooth 
interactions later on as adults in the workplace. The tendency to accept disadvantageous 
inequality more often later on in adolescence as well as increasing concerns for efficiency are 
mirror findings and a confirmation of the work by Almås et al. (2010). The relatively strong 
decline in egalitarian motives is an important qualification of the earlier results by Fehr et al. 
(2008) for 3- to 8-year-old children, where egalitarianism is the overarching motive for 8-
year-olds. Our study shows that egalitarianism peaks around the age of 8-11 years. Inequality 
aversion in dictator games may thus be a more influential motive relatively early on in life, 
i.e., in late childhood, while altruistic motives become more important in adolescence. In our 
design, altruism is associated with the motive of maximizing the sum of payoffs, a concern 
that the theory of Charness and Rabin (2002) stresses. Our evidence suggests that their theory 
becomes relatively more suitable as an explanation for human behavior when subjects reach 
their later teenage years (which is also confirmed for adults in the work by Engelmann and 
Strobel, 2004). 
We find that the frequency of spiteful behavior decreases strongly with age. The 
incidence of spiteful behavior among the oldest adolescents in our study is fairly similar to 
that observed in adults (Falk et al., 2005; Herrmann et al., 2008), indicating that the 
significant changes in the prevalence of spite occur in adolescence and have been captured in 
our study. 
With respect to gender differences, we found that girls are significantly more likely to 
have egalitarian preferences than boys. In the age group of 16- to 17-year-olds, roughly one-
third of women can be classified as egalitarian, while this is true for less than 20% of men. 
This gender difference with respect to egalitarianism fits with the data of Almås et al. (2010) 
for teenagers, but also with Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2007) who have shown in a large-scale 
newspaper experiment with several thousands adult participants that women care more for 
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egalitarian distributions of a pie than men. In our experiment, it is important to note, however, 
that the preference for egalitarian allocations becomes weaker in both males and females as 
they get older. The share of altruistic types increases with age, and it is always significantly 
higher for males than females. No gender differences have been found with respect to the 
fraction of spiteful types. 
A particularly noteworthy finding of our study is the fact that parochialism – i.e., the 
differential treatment of in-group and out-group members – emerges in adolescence.14 While 
the age in which parochialism becomes significant varies slightly across single games (see 
Table A1), the general pattern emerging from our experiment suggests that the distinction 
between in-group and out-group members becomes behaviorally relevant in the course of 
socialization in adolescence. Concerning the different types of other-regarding preferences, 
we observe significant in-group favoritism of altruistic types starting at the age of 14/15 years, 
and spitefulness is significantly stronger towards out-group members from the age of 12/13 
years onwards (see Table A2). One explanation could be that the increasing exposure to and 
membership in new social groups (e.g., in school, clubs, or peer groups) makes the difference 
between in-group and out-group members more salient in the later teenage years, thus 
triggering different behaviors across in-groups and out-groups. 
Perhaps the most important finding in our study – from an evolutionary perspective – 
is the joint development of altruism and parochialism. The evolutionary model developed by 
Choi and Bowles (2007) postulates that altruism towards fellow group members and 
parochialism in the form of hostile acts against out-group members may have evolved jointly 
in the history of humankind. This evolutionary theory is attractive for explaining why 
altruistic behavior and spiteful behavior can co-exist simultaneously within the same 
individual. The theory is generally hard to test with field data from the historic development 
of societies, however, because it is practically impossible to quantify the level of generosity or 
parochialism in ancient societies. Our experiment can shed light on how the levels of altruistic 
behavior and parochialism change in childhood and adolescence. While our results should not 
be viewed as a literal test of the evolutionary theory of parochial altruism, it is telling that 
altruism and parochialism develop during the same time period, namely adolescence. 
                                                 
14 Evidence for parochialism among adults is given in Bernhard, Fischbacher and Fehr (2006). They show in a 
somewhat different context (a third party punishment experiment) that third-party punishers protect ingroup 
victims much more than they do outgroup victims, regardless whether the distributing norm violator belonged to 
their own social group or not. Moreover, norm violators expect less punishment if the punisher is an ingroup 
member. Our results show that parochialism seems to materialize before adulthood already. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1. Definition of other-regarding preference types 
Type Prosocial game Envy game Sharing game 
Strongly egalitarian (1/1) (1/1) (1/1) 
Weakly egalitarian (1/1) (1/1) (2/0) 
Strongly altruistic (1/1) (1/2) (1/1) 
Weakly altruistic (1/1) (1/2) (2/0) 
Spiteful (1/0) (1/1) (2/0) 
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Table 2. χ2-tests for behavioral differences in “in-group all” and “in-group half” 
Age group Prosocial game Envy game Sharing game 
8/9 years p=0.157 p=0.979 p=0.791 
10/11 years p=0.856 p=0.382 p=0.913 
12/13 years p=0.678 p=0.083 p=0.923 
14/15 years p=0.923 p=0.342 p=0.925 
16/17 years p=0.902 p=0.532 p=0.536 
The table shows that there is no significant difference between the in-group half and the in-group all 
condition at the 5%-level in any of the comparisons. The one weakly significant difference (in the envy 
game for 12- to 13-year-olds) is well within the limits of chance. 
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Table 3. Sample size 
Grade Age group Control question 
correct 
Control question 
wrong 
Total 
3rd 8/9 years 71 17 88 
5th 10/11 years 207 13 220 
7th 12/13 years 172 3 175 
9th 14/15 years 135 2 137 
11th 16/17 years 132 0 132 
  717 35 752 
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Table 4. Exchange rate and weekly average pocket money 
Age group Exchange rate of 
1 point 
Increase* Weekly pocket money 
(average) 
Increase 
8/9 years 0.5 €  2.9 €  
10/11 years 0.75 € + 50% 4.7 € + 62% 
12/13 years 1 € + 33% 6.5 € + 38% 
14/15 years 2 € + 100% 13.4 € + 106% 
16/17 years 3 € + 50% 23.7 € + 77% 
*  measures the relative increase in pocket money by age group in row x over age group in row x–1. 
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Table 5. Probit regressions with egalitarian choice as dependent variable 
Independent variables Prosocial game Envy game Sharing game 
female  0.028  0.174***  0.053*** 
age exact#  0.037*** -0.059*** -0.004 
in-group  0.097** -0.056  0.071*** 
BIC§  811.3  917.8  449.2 
# observations  717  717  717 
The table shows marginal effects. Robust standard errors clustered on class level. 
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
# age exact in years and months 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
Including controls for only child, a dummy for youngest child, the number of siblings and the amount of pocket money per 
week separately to the regressions does not yield any significant effects. 
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Table 6. Probit regressions with other-regarding preference type as dependent variable 
Independent variables Egalitarian type Altruistic type Spiteful type 
female  0.175*** -0.152*** -0.023 
age exact# -0.024***  0.062*** -0.030*** 
in-group  0.048  0.048 -0.118*** 
BIC§  916.0  902.7  761.4 
# observations  717  717  717 
The table shows marginal effects. Robust standard errors clustered on class level. 
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
# age exact in years and months 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
Including controls for only child, a dummy for youngest child, the number of siblings and the amount of pocket money per 
week separately to the regressions does not yield any significant effects. 
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Figure 1. The relative frequency of egalitarian choices across games and age groups 
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Figure 2. The relative frequency of egalitarian choices in in-group and out-group 
condition 
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Figure 3. The relative frequency of egalitarian choices of males and females 
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Figure 4. Behavioral types across age groups 
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Figure 5. Behavioral types and parochialism 
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Figure 6. Behavioral types and gender 
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Appendix 
 
Tables 
 
 
Table A1. Probit regressions with egalitarian choice as dependent variable – Interaction 
of in-group condition and age group as well as gender and age exact (corrected for 
interaction terms)A 
Independent variables Prosocial game Envy game Sharing game 
female  0.103  0.087  0.207** 
Age exact  0.023* -0.051***  0.002 
in-group -0.297*  0.236  0.050 
in-group*age exact  0.032** -0.022**  0.002 
Female*age exact -0.005 0.006  -0.012* 
BIC§  818.6  928.8  460.2 
# observations  717  717  717 
Marginal effects 
In-group-effect (for female age 9) -.043 .025 .104 
In-group-effect (for female age 11) .032 .000 .096** 
In-group-effect (for female age 13) .093** -.039 .087*** 
In-group-effect (for female age 15) .134*** -.086*** .078*** 
In-group-effect (for female age 17) .154*** -.131*** .068** 
In-group-effect (for male age 9) -.044 .035 .041 
In-group-effect (for male age 11) .034 .000 .046* 
In-group-effect (for male age 13) .099** -.044 .051*** 
In-group-effect (for male age 15) .142*** -.085*** .056*** 
In-group-effect (for male age 17) .161*** -.112*** .062* 
Gender effect (for in-group age 9) .070 .094* .147*** 
Gender effect (for in-group age 11) .052 .134*** .110*** 
Gender effect (for in-group age 13) .033 .166*** .075*** 
Gender effect (for in-group age 15) .017 .181*** .042 
Gender effect (for in-group age 17) .006 .174*** .012 
Gender effect (for out-group age 9) .068 .104* .085** 
Gender effect (for out-group age 11) .054 .134*** .060** 
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Gender effect (for out-group age 13) .039 .161*** .039*** 
Gender effect (for out-group age 15) .025 .182*** .021 
Gender effect (for out-group age 17) .013 .193*** .006 
The table shows marginal effects. Robust standard errors clustered on class level.  
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
A Note that standard software does not correctly calculate marginal effects and p-values of interaction terms in nonlinear 
models (see Ai and Norton, 2003). We corrected for this and present the adjusted tests on joint coefficients. 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
Including controls for only child, a dummy for youngest child, the number of siblings and the amount of pocket money per 
week separately to the regressions does not yield any significant effects. 
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Table A2. Probit regressions with other-regarding preference type as dependent 
variable – Interaction of in-group condition and age group as well as gender and age 
exact (corrected for interaction terms)A 
Independent variables Egalitarian type Altruistic type Spiteful type 
female  0.036 -0.043 -0.143 
Age exact -0.029*  0.052*** -0.023* 
in-group  0.067 -0.313** 0.182 
in-group*age exact -0.001  0.027*** -0.023* 
Female*age exact  0.011 -0.008  0.009 
BIC§  928.5  912.5  770.5 
# observations  717  717  717 
Marginal effects 
In-group-effect (for female age 9) .061 -.042 -.023 
In-group-effect (for female age 11) .058 -.017 -.075 
In-group-effect (for female age 13) .054 .027 -.114*** 
In-group-effect (for female age 15) .050 .084** -.140*** 
In-group-effect (for female age 17) .046 .141*** -.152*** 
In-group-effect (for male age 9) .057 -.056 -.025 
In-group-effect (for male age 11) .051 -.022 -.081 
In-group-effect (for male age 13) .044 .031 -.122*** 
In-group-effect (for male age 15) .037 .085** -.144*** 
In-group-effect (for male age 17) .030 .124*** -.149*** 
Gender effect (for in-group age 9) .143 -.065 -.081 
Gender effect (for in-group age 11) .163** -.104** -.051 
Gender effect (for in-group age 13) .178*** -.142*** -.026 
Gender effect (for in-group age 15) .188*** -.164*** -.007 
Gender effect (for in-group age 17) .193*** -.162*** .003 
Gender effect (for out-group age 9) .140 -.079 -.082 
Gender effect (for out-group age 11) .156** -.109** -.057 
Gender effect (for out-group age 13) .168*** -.138*** -.034 
Gender effect (for out-group age 15) .175*** -.163*** -.012 
Gender effect (for out-group age 17) .177*** -.179*** .007 
The table shows marginal effects. Robust standard errors clustered on class level.  
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
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A Note that standard software does not correctly calculate marginal effects and p-values of interaction terms in nonlinear 
models (see Ai and Norton, 2003). We corrected for this and present the adjusted tests on joint coefficients. 
§ Bayesian information criterion 
Including controls for only child, a dummy for youngest child, the number of siblings and the amount of pocket money per 
week separately to the regressions does not yield any significant effects. 
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Supplementary material (not intended for publication) 
 
Experimental material 
Procedures: 
Each session in this experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes, including the completion of 
a post-experimental questionnaire and the distribution of the earned money. All subjects 
received their money in private at the very end of the session.  
Note that all sessions within a particular school were run on the same day. In order to 
guarantee anonymity, we used partition walls and forbade any kind of conversation between 
students. The experimenter memorized the instructions and presented them orally in class at 
the beginning of each session. The instructor paused periodically and let the subjects raise 
their hands for questions which were then answered privately. An English translation of oral 
instructions and of the decision sheets is presented below. 
 
Experimental instructions 
Welcome to our game. Before we start, we will explain the rules of our game to you. From 
now on, please don’t speak to your neighbors and listen carefully. You can earn money in this 
game. We will give you the money in cash at the end of the game. It is important that you 
listen carefully now, to make sure that you understand the rules of our game. We will stop 
frequently during our explanation and allow you to ask questions. Therefore, please raise your 
hand and one of us will come to you to answer your question. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
We will play a game in which you have to decide how to divide money between two 
people. Each of you will get three different decision sheets. We have brought an example 
along. Let’s look at the example together (put the slide on the overhead projector). 
 
(From here on instructions between treatments – outgroup, ingroup all, and ingroup 
half – differ. We first give the instructions for the outgroup and for the ingroup-all treatment, 
secondly for the ingroup-half treatment.) 
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Outgroup/(Ingroup all)15: 
You will need to decide how to divide money between yourself and a student from this 
class (point at the picture on the overhead projector). Do you know the students in this class? 
No? (Yes?) This photo shows people from another class in the same grade as you (from your 
class). Each student from your class will be randomly matched with one student from this 
other class that is in the same grade. (another student from your class). 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
There are two possible ways to allocate the money: the option on the left-hand side 
and the option on the right-hand side. 
With option “left” you get one point and the student from another class in the same 
grade (your class) with whom you are randomly matched gets no points. One point equals 50 
cents (€0.75, € 1, €2, €3, depending on the age group). With option “right” you get two points 
and the student from another class in the same grade (your class) gets one point. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Depending on which option you want to choose, you check the box at the left- or the 
right-hand side. (Ask a student for his name.) Let’s assume that Markus would like to divide 
the money according to option “right”. Which box would he have to check? Right, the box at 
the “right” side. How much would Markus earn and how much would the student from 
another class in the same grade (your class) with whom Markus is randomly matched earn in 
this case? Right, Markus would get €1 (€1.50, € 2, €4, €6, depending on the age group) and 
the student from another class in the same grade (your class) 50 cents (€0.75, € 1, €2, €3, 
depending on the age group). (Write the exchange rate at the blackboard. 0 points = €0, 1 
point = 50 cents, 2 points = €1.) 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
As we mentioned earlier, you will get three decision sheets. The three decision sheets 
differ from each other in the amounts of money that can be divided. At the end of the game 
                                                 
15 Instructions for the in-group all condition are underlined and in brackets. Instructions for the in-group half 
condition follow below. 
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you will get the money based on your decisions for all decision sheets. We will add up the 
money from all three decision sheets. The student from another class in the same grade (your 
class) with whom you share your money also receives the money from all decision sheets. 
How much money you and the student from another class in the same grade (your class) 
receive depends on your decisions. (Furthermore, you will receive the money which another 
student from your class decided to give to you. How much you receive in this case depends on 
the other student’s decisions.)  
 
Ingroup half: 
You will need to decide how to divide money between yourself and a student from this 
class (point at the picture on the overhead projector). Do you know the people from this 
class? Yes? This photo shows people from your class. In this game we will randomly match 
groups of two people. In each group we have one “person 1” and one “person 2”. Person 1 
gets to decide how to divide the money between person 1 and person 2. 
Could you please draw a card from this bag? Thank you! What’s your name? Markus, 
in this example you have drawn the role of person 1. You may therefore decide about the 
division of the money in your group. You will need to share the money with one person from 
your class who has drawn the role of person 2. (Ask a student for her name.) Let’s assume 
Julia has drawn that role. You, therefore, do not have to make any decisions in this game. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
There are two possible ways to allocate the money: the option on the left-hand side 
and the option on the right-hand side. 
With option “left”, Markus as person 1 gets one point and person 2 (Julia) gets no 
points. One point equals 50 cents (€0.75, € 1, €2, €3, depending on the age group). With 
option “right” Markus gets two points and Julia gets one point. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Depending on which option Markus would want to choose, he would check the box at 
the left or the right-hand side. Let’s assume that Markus would like to divide the money 
according to option “right”. Which box does he have to check? Right, the box at the “right” 
side. How much would Markus earn and how much Julia in this case? Right, Markus gets €1 
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(€1.50, € 2, €4, €6, depending on the age group) and Julia gets 50 cents (€0.75, € 1, €2, €3, 
depending on the age group). (Write the exchange rate at the blackboard. 0 points = €0, 1 
point = 50 cents, 2 points = €1.) 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
As already mentioned, you will get three decision sheets. However, only students who 
have drawn the role of the person 1 receive these sheets. The three decision sheets differ from 
each other in the amounts of money that can be divided. At the end of the game, person 1 will 
get the money based on his/her decisions for all decision sheets. We will add up the money 
from all three decision sheets. Person 2 also receives the money from all decision sheets. How 
much money person 1 and person 2 receive depends on person 1’s decisions. 
 
 
 
 
Control questions 
All subjects had to answer two control questions in order to check the comprehension of the 
experiment. Therefore subjects were given a sample decision sheet where one of the two 
allocations was chosen (the respective boxes were ticked off). The subject had to indicate how 
much money the decision maker and the recipient would earn in this example. 
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Example (overhead projector) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               for me  for me 
 
0 Points 1 Point 
Real photo Real photo 
2 Points 1 Point 
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Decision sheet (for envy game) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               for me  for me 
 
[analogously for the other games] 
1 Point 2 Points 
Real photo Real photo 
1 Point 1 Point 
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Information about the school system in Austria 
 
In Austria, children enter school at the age of six to seven years. For the first four 
years of their schooling, there is no selection into different schools as all children attend 
elementary schools. After grade 4 in elementary school there exists a dual schooling system in 
Austria. While roughly one quarter of the students goes on directly to a high school track that 
grants admission to university after eight more years (with this type of schools being called 
“Gymnasium”) all other children attend a four-year track called “Hauptschule”. About 70% of 
students finishing “Hauptschule” switch to a “Gymnasium” or another track leading to 
university admission (vocational higher school), while around 30% move to a one-year or 
three-year track that prepares them for entering the job market at age 15 or 17. 
In our study we observe children who attend the 3rd grade of elementary school as 
well as the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th grade of a “Gymnasium”. Therefore, we have a re-matching 
of children in grade 1 of “Gymnasium”, and partly after grade 4 in “Gymnasium” when 
former “Hauptschule”-students switch to a “Gymnasium”. 
 
 
 
